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Abstract
In order to operate the CERN accelerators complex safely, the acquisition,
transport and management of safety alarms is of crucial importance.  The
French regulatory authority [Direction de Sûreté des Installations
Nucléaires de Base (INB)] defines them as Level 3 alarms; they represent
as such a danger for the life and require an immediate intervention of the
Fire Brigade.  Safety alarms are generated by fire and flammable gas
detection systems, electrical emergency stops, and other safety related
systems.  Level 3 alarms are transmitted for reliability reasons to their
operation centre: the CERN Safety Control Room (SCR) using two
different media: the hard-wired network and a computer based system.  The
hard-wired networks are connected to local panels summarizing in 34
security areas the overall CERN geography.  The computer based system
offers data management facilities such as alarm acquisition, distribution,
archiving and information correlation.  The Level 3 alarms system is in
constant evolution in order to achieve better reliability and to integrate new
safety turn-key systems provided by industry
1. INTRODUCTION
Level 3 alarms at CERN are alarms raised in situations endangering people and requiring immediate
action by the Fire Brigade. (For a fuller definition with the references, see Section 2).  They concern
the whole of CERN, that is the  Meyrin, Prévessin and LEP sites.  Their main users are the firemen in
the SCR (Safety Control Room).
The Level 3 alarm system comprises detection equipment on the spot:
- fire detection equipment,
- flammable gas detection equipment,
- emergency stops,
- miscellaneous (for a detailed classification, see Section 2).
The first three categories cover more than 90% of the Level 3 alarms.
Signals are transmitted via the communication systems.  The data processing system is the main
one which provides the SCR with the details (type of alarm, location, description, etc.).  This system
is backed up by a hard-wired system permitting lower-grade operation in the event of the failure of
the main system.
Data handling systems such as the Central Alarm Server (CAS) and the Technical Data Server
(TDS), associated with the existing communication networks, make it possible to manage the alarms.
The alarms are displayed on workstations or on wall-mounted panels.
For organizational and geographical grouping, CERN has been divided into 34 areas. A local
panel in each area shows the alarms that may occur.
1.1 Development
The development of Level 3 alarms management may historically be summarized in three stages.
1.1.1 Stage 1
During an initial stage, from the establishment of CERN to the start-up of LEP, the data were
distributed to the SCR and TCR (Technical Control Room) via a hard-wired system showing the
location and nature of the alarm on a wall mounted panel.  This system was assisted by a data
processing system running a log.  The TELEMECANIQUE system used in the '70s was replaced by a
BBC system in the '80s.
1.1.2 Stage 2
In a second stage, the start-up of LEP brought about a considerable increase in the number of alarms
and the merging of the systems with the replacement of the BBC system. This data processing system
assisted by a hard-wired system suffers several drawbacks: alarm triggering times are not accurately
represented and alarm bursts disrupt the system; only the geographical indication of the area
generating the alarm but not its nature is represented on the local panel.
1.1.3 Stage 3
Developments in the third stage are towards a more uniform system which should result in more
reliable and easier operation in the SCR. The modifications involve the bulk integration of industrial
systems, improvements in the data processing system (CAS and the introduction of the TDS, see
Section 5) and the improvement/renewal of the hard-wired system and local panels. This program is
now in hand and should be completed in 2000.
1.2 The future
If this third stage proves reliable, the system thus installed may be regarded as the starting point
for the LHC.
2. DEFINITIONS AND REGULATIONS
A Level 3 alarm is generated by an accident or abnormal situation. The type of alarm concerns (Fig.1):
-  smoke detector,
-  gas detector,
-  emergency telephone,
-  general emergency stop,
-  oxygen concentration detector,
-  flood detector,
-  actuating an evacuation signal,
-  lift blockage,
-  “dead man” handle type alarm.
The above definitions are found in the Safety Instruction 37 (TIS IS37). The legal documents
relevant for safety at CERN are the following:
-  Staff Rules and Regulations, 10th edition, 1st January 1996,
-  CERN Safety Policy, SAPOCO 42, Rev. September 1994,
-  "Ionizing radiation" agreement between France and CERN, 28.4.1972,
-  The French decree "Quality arrangements" dated 10.8.1984,
-  The "Safety of installations" agreement between France and CERN dated 31.10.1984,
- TIS Safety Instruction N° 37,
- The final LEP safety report, 1994 edition.
This report was written under the terms of the agreement signed by the French State and the
Organization on 31.10.1984.  It was drawn up for the Directorate for the Safety of Nuclear
Installations.  Here are the alarm transmission provisions in Article V.8.3.1: “Les alarmes de
niveau 3 sont disponibles sur le réseau informatisé des services généraux. De plus un réseau
câblé fil-à-fil assure la redondance nécessaire pour la transmission des alarmes de niveau 3”.
Figure 1 - Level 3 alarms distribution.
Figure 2 - Firemen interventions.
3. GENERAL DESCRIPTION
3.1 Present situation
In LEP and progressively on the Meyrin site, all Level 3 alarms are transmitted to the SCR (Fig. 2)
and to the TCR via a computer network and displayed as a text message on a terminal (Fig. 3).
At present, the Central Alarm Server handles only 3640 alarms over the 16854, the remaining alarms
being not yet computerized.














The redundancy required by the “Installations Nucléaires de Base” rules is achieved by means
of a hard-wired network [1]. All devices generating an alarm of level 3 are connected to the Safety
Control Room.  In LEP and progressively on the Meyrin site, these hard-wired signals are transmitted
via a local panel (one for each defined area) which displays the location of the alarm source.  The
hard-wired signal causes a LED to blink on the local synoptic panel indicating the building from
which the alarm comes and the type of alarm.
Apart from Red Telephones, an incoming subsequent alarm would make a LED blink faster.
When the detector that caused the alarm is reset to zero, the corresponding LED remains bright;
should the alarm(s) vanish, then the LEDs will go off.  Transient alarms are also handled but will
only be cleared after the reset of the detector and the disappearance of the alarm.  A "General Alarm"
summuray signal from the local synoptic panel is always transmitted to the SCR; this signal indicates
the area concerned.
Only a reset of the local panel will turn off this "General Alarm" in the SCR.
3.2 Adaptations under way
After the double safety alarm transmission system was put into service for LEP, the same approach
was adopted for the modernization of the other CERN areas.  The SPS areas have been almost
completely renovated and the 14 remaining areas of the Meyrin site will be following as the oldest
fire and flammable gas detection systems are replaced by modern ones.
4. HARD-WIRED NETWORKS
4.1 History
The Level 3 alarms were originally only transmitted in hard wired form, and the location and nature
of the alarm were displayed on a large mimic diagram in the TCR and SCR.  Owing to the long
distances involved with LEP, local panels were set up covering all the Level 3 alarms in a
geographical area.  Each local panel is connected by two wires to a summary panel in the SCR.
(See Figure 4.)
Subsequently, this principle was extended to all CERN's sites for the sake of uniformity and to
cut down the number of LEDs to connect.  From this time on, the nature of the alarm was lost and
only the location remained. There are at present 34 local panels.
4.2 Visual aspect
The local panels are of the standard 19" size and silk-screen printed on anodized aluminium panels.
The background is green, the buildings concerned pale grey, the buildings not involved and the
access roads are of the natural colour of the panel. The LEDs displaying the alarms are red.
4.3 Operating principle
The local panels are represented on the summary panel by a LED which lights up when a Level 3
alarm is actuated on the corresponding panel. With each local panel is associated a computerized
"general area alarm".
Each area consists of:
-  patch panels centralising the alarm generator contacts,
-  an interface (relay boards and sequencer),
-  a local panel.
On the local panel, there are one or more LEDs per building. They are identified according to
the alarm type (F for fire detection, AU for emergency stop, etc.).
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 4.4 Limitations of the existing system
The limitations of the existing system are mentioned below:
- The redundancy is not always ensured, as some computerized and hard-wired alarm transmission
cables share the same path.
- The technology used in the current system dates back to the '60s.  Dry contacts run from the alarm
generators to relay interfaces, which redistribute them via wires to the local and master panels.
This technology has acquired certain limitations with time: poor contacts, "stuck" relays,
sensitivity to vibration, etc.
- It is not an industrial but a "CERN" system.  Monitoring and corrective maintenance have become
difficult with time.
- Lines monitoring requires the use of current loops to detect any breaks and short circuits.  This
was acceptable at the time of the PS and SPS, but has become difficult with LEP owing to the long
distances between the acquired points and the main interface, as the line resistance becomes very
considerable due to the end of line load resistance.
- Induction and parasitic phenomena occur on the transmission cables.
- It is difficult and expensive to update the "hardware" panels.
- A paper based cable documentation system has been in existence since the beginning of CERN.
This system is still in use despite several attempts at computerization.  These have failed mainly
owing to a lack of human resources and the complexity of the proposed systems.  It is difficult to
update the documentation and it is therefore not fully up to date.  A new computerization project,
jointly with the CERN telephone service, is on hand.
Figure 4 -  Example of local panel and computerized mimic diagram.
5. EXISTING COMPUTER SYSTEMS
The SCR is an alarm-driven control room in the sense that the arrival of an alarm alerts the operator
so that he may take appropriate actions.  The operator acts upon the alarms primarily by consulting
and interacting with mimic diagrams.  These human-computer interfaces [2], alarms and mimic
diagrams, have been structured systematically and standardized to a large extent, in spite of the large
diversity of installations being supervised.  Any new installation must be integrated seamlessly into
this environment. (See Figure 3.)
5.1 The Central Alarm Server
The Central Alarm Server (CAS) [3] is the common alarm server for all alarms handled by the SCR.
It gathers alarms from the equipment for logging and presentation to the users.  The Central Alarm
Server is not only used for the safety alarms, but mainly for the SL accelerator complex and technical
services.  This demonstrates its robustness and adaptability.  A hot spare system is implemented to
provide maximum availability to the users.
The Fault States (FS) are detected at the equipment level by User Surveillance Programs (USP)
and are sent using a defined protocol to a local alarm server.  The captured alarm is sent to a process
which performs alarm treatment such as data reduction, and handles the communication with the
CAS.  The CAS stores and logs centrally all the alarms.  The CAS dispatches alarms on an event-
driven basis to the alarm consoles.  Within the CAS, every alarm is completed with related static
information (responsible, location, etc.).  The CAS offers many other functionalities such as alarm
archiving, retrieval and alarm inhibition.  A related system: the “Help Alarm” provides detailed
location, cause, consequence and actions information for every alarm.
5.2 Equipment Integration
The oldest integration of fire and gas detection information is performed by connecting a detection
system to a local sequencer which animates local synoptics.  The sequencer is itself wired to the
digital input ports of an Equipment Control Assembly (ECA), allowing the safety event to enter the
alarm level 3 software transmission chain (Fig. 3 *A).
An ECA is a G64 based system which monitors analog, digital inputs and outputs. The ECAs
are connected to a long distance MIL-1553 fieldbus deployed around the SPS and the Meyrin site.
The captured alarms are sent by the ECA to the CAS via the Front End devices using the alarm
processes described before.  The Front End devices are standard VME racks powered by PowerPC
processors running LynxOS.  They act as gateway between the field buses and the Ethernet control
network.
Even with the more modern integration methods, the detection system is always connected in
parallel to a sequencer for hard-wired data transmission to the SCR.
In the early nineties the fire and gas detection systems were connected directly to the ECAs
(Fig. 3 *B).
Since 1993, Siemens PLCs have been increasingly used in conjunction with the industrial
supervisor FactoryLink.  In this context, the detection system is connected directly to the PLC
(Fig. 3 *C).  Such local PLCs communicate via Profibus to a data concentrator which forwards the
data via the Siemens Sinec H1 protocol to FactoryLink.
FactoryLink has been integrated in the technical infrastructure control system.  A special CAS
interface module was developed and added to the FactoryLink application in order to transmit alarms
in a standard way.
The latest technology which will be described in the next chapter integrates directly the
detection system at the Profibus (Sinec L2) level (Fig. 3 *D) (Defined as phase 3 in the Introduction).
6. ALARM LEVEL 3 SUPERVISION BY THE TECHNICAL DATA SERVER
6.1 The TDS context
At CERN, the TCR monitors data coming from the electrical distribution, cooling water, air
conditioning, vacuum, cryogenics, safety and other systems.
A TDS has been implemented to manage this data. The TDS was firstly introduced to improve
alarm management (acquisition reliability, alarm burst handling, time stamping).
It provides data collected from equipment using a standard TCP/IP interface to the high-level
control software such as Human Computer Interfaces (HCI), a Data Logging System (DLS) and a
Central Alarm Server (CAS).  It performs real time data storage and distribution, alarm filtering, data
archiving and playback, and command management in a distributed, multi-platform environment.
Technical infrastructure data are used by other CERN control rooms and by those responsible for
equipment.  The TDS is now operational and several thousand tags are under integration.
The aim of the TDS is to focus on reliability and performance, its concept has been rapidly
applied to the field of the Level 3 alarms.
6.2 TDS principles
Equipment data are sent by their control devices using drivers (e.g. SINEC H1, CERN SL Equip,
Landis Visonik) to an Equipment Controller (EC) which converts them to the TDS tag format and
forwards them to the TDS using the Generic TDS Equipment Access Protocol (GTEAP).
The tags are then stored in the TDS’s local real-time databases (RTdaq) and are published to
subscribing applications by a central server. The client applications receive the data by subscribing to
particular data sets called data groups. All data arriving in the TDS are archived for 72 hours
(allowing post-mortem analysis of incidents). Archive data can be played back in client applications
just like the real-time data.  The alarms are sent to the expert system (RTie) using the RTworks
Guaranteed Message Delivery (GMD) mechanism which ensures that no data is lost even in the case
of network or server unavailability.  The expert system performs alarm deduction, filtering, alarm
burst detection, and data correlation.
The TDS processes communicate via a dedicated message server.  Applications can run on a
single workstation or can be distributed across multiple processors in a heterogeneous network.
A special mechanism informs in real time the relevant client applications of any non-
availability of an element (RTdaq, EC..) in the data transmission chain.
All commands sent using the TDS are identified, logged, and their execution status is checked.
The TDS application programming interface (GTAAL) allows any client application to exchange data
with the TDS.  It is based on the reception of pre-defined messages handled as application call-backs.
Tag definition and system configuration data are held in a reference database providing a
totally data driven system.
The TDS supervision module monitors the overall system and centralizes error treatment.  An
anti-flooding mechanism has been implemented whereby only tags, different from their default
values, are transmitted at initialization thus optimizing system performance.
The application of the TDS to alarm level 3 management is demonstrated by the new fire-
detection and ventilation-supervision system of the SPS.
The detection systems are integrated at the Profibus level by a PLC data concentrator, located
in every SPS surface building.  This device communicates via TCP/IP to an Equipment Controller
interfacing the TDS.  The TDS interfaces with the Landis Visonik control system using another
Equipment Controller and sends command sequence to the SPS ventilation processes according to
decision matrices.
The SPS fire detection-control system [4] was provided by an external contractor and easily
integrated into the TDS using the GTEAP specification.  The TDS captures the data as close as
possible to the hardware and distributes it safely to any customer such as the Central Alarm server.
The data may be filtered or correlated by the TDS expert system according to the specification of the
appropriate specialists [5] - [9].
7. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
The method of the Level 3 alarm transmission as described above and illustrated in Fig. 5 is to be
applied to the whole of CERN.  A wide-ranging program is on hand and will be completed towards
the end of the year 2000.   It includes:
- installing standard local mimic diagrams for the 34 areas (so far, 18 are operational; 11 on the
Meyrin site are partially connected);
- integrating all the Level 3 alarms under the ST Division's responsibility (elimination of the old
ECATCR) in the TDS;
- the replacement of the sequencers and distribution frames (especially on the Meyrin site);
- drawing up a complete database for cables (already started);
- the analysis of all the cable systems in order to detect the "shared modes".
At the end of its renewal program, CERN should have a reliable Level 3 alarm distribution and
management system meeting the requirements of the INB.  Likewise, this design would be uniform
on all the sites and machines.
8. RECOMMENDATION FOR LHC
The principles now established and the experience obtained with the existing system may be used as
a starting point for the LHC era.  It is strongly recommended that the LHC should be regarded as a
machine forming an integral part of CERN and that uniformity of principles should be ensured for the
Laboratory.  We must avoid repeating the experience of the LEP project, where the use of different
principles in alarm management resulted in the need for subsequent standardization.
The complementary nature of the hard wired and computerized systems should be retained.  It
is unrealistic to consider the hard-wired system solely in relation to the number of existing alarm
systems.  Greater attention will have to be paid to the computerized system to ensure the maximum
reliability expected of a safety system.
Finally, the principles now established, with the necessary technological evolution, can be used
as a basis for the LHC monitoring.  There must be one single principle for the whole of the
laboratory, covering both old and new installations.
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